Uniting Men - Jean Monnet - Introduction

Jean Monnet, European Parliament, Strasbourg
Courtesy; Media Library Jean Monnet for Europe Foundation,
Lausanne, Switzerland

Uniting Men — Jean Monnet

Introduction

Man's finest profession is that of uniting men.
                                      — Saint-Exupery

France, Bordeaux: World War I, end of September 1914—The French had been just able to stop the advance of the Germans on the river Marne. The French government had fled Paris and was functioning from Bordeaux, where confusion prevailed. A young man presented himself at the office of Rone  Viviani, the French Prime minister. He was just 26 of age, did  not possess any diploma  and did not hold any official position. His family, it was  sad, ran a firm selling cognac, the famous brandy of that name  To the slightly  surprised French prime Minister he developed the following  arguments: France and Great Britain are engaged in  war each on its own, The equipment necessary for each army is purchased separately. It results in a great wastage of time and  resources. The Allies are competing with each other to get raw materials and cargoes. There are absurd and unnecessary duplications.  We need a common organization for production, supply and sea transport. 

Viviani was impressed by  this idea which was very simple but very novel at a time when national egos were still very powerful He sent this unknown young man, whose name was Jean  Monnet, to the Minister for war, Millerand, in turn,

posted him to London, where he stayed till the end of the war. There, in collaboration with a remarkable Minister for Trade Clementel,¹Monnet set to work. He created common purchasing services so as to avoid competition between the two countries which had been fighting each other over goods on the Australian and Argentinean markets. Monnet was instrumental in setting up the Wheat Executive which was to be responsible for the purchasing, sharing and shipment of grain between Great Britain, France and Italy. Then the submarine blockade enforced by the Germans had a terrible effect on the Allied supplies, especially for France because part of her territory was in enemy hands so that much of her labour force was lost to the army. There were just not enough ships. Monnet tackled this problem head on. Private interests had opposed the full requisition of the merchant fleet. In consequence, armies and private ship owners were fighting over ships. Monnet and his friends proposed the creation of an Allied shipping pool, with a definition of priorities and principle of equality in front of restrictions. The British fleet was requisitioned.  In 1917 the French fleet was requisitioned at last. The idea — and the practice — of common action gained ground: people started to recognize -that common needs had to be examined  together, and that the Allies must see together how available goods could be shared. The Allied Maritime Transport Committee was officially set up in March 1918. When the American troops had to be transported to Europe this organization proved crucial. At the end of March 1918, there were only 350,000 men in Europe. At the end of the war there were more than two million. That is to say that thanks to this joint body, from May to October, 260,000 Americans could cross the Atlantic each month. Not until the summer, did the American shipbuilding programme add  to the available tonnage.

Monnet made a number of enemies. He and his energetic team actually disturbed many people's working habits as they often ignored the hierarchical channels. Monnet had insisted, for instance, to get a private and direct line with Clementel's office

 in Paris. In 1917, some people in the corridors of powers in France felt that it was time to send this annoying young man to the battle front. Monnet was summoned by Clemenceau, the redoubtable Prime Minister, also called "the Tiger". Clemenceau did not have time to waste: Explain to me what you are doing in London. Monnet explained. A week later Monnet was called back. Clemenceau handed him a piece of paper: Monnet was to return at once to his post in London. It was a decree of the Cabinet. Even Monnet's enemies had been forced to sign.  

London, World War II, June 1940 — The French army was being routed and the British army isolated. The future looked totally uncertain. Monnet was in London again. The lessons of 1917 had been learnt and there was now an official Anglo-French Coordinating Committee whose chairman was Jean Monnet. But the Panzer divisions were advancing fast. The Germans crossed the river Marne and entered Paris. In the middle of this desperate situation, Monnet conceived of a revolutionary proposal, "a radical blow stricken at the heart of States' sovereignty": a total fusion between England and France — one flag, one parliament^ one people. Monnet convinced Horace Wilson, who in turn persuaded Chamberlain to speak to Churchill. The British Prime Minister was startled and not really convinced. But, as he later said, "in this crisis we must not let ourselves be accused of lack of imagination". Churchill accepted to bring the proposal to the War Cabinet, whose members to his utter surprise were quite enthusiastic. The ministers would meet the following day and finalize the text. That same day General de Gaulle, the new secretary of State for war, arrived in London. Monnet explained to him the project of union. As Churchill, de Gaulle was not convinced, but he was conscious of the grandeur of the gesture and of the effect such  a declaration could have on the morale of the French people.  The text was approved by the English Council of Minitsters. De Gaulle called the French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud over the Phone. Reynaud was in Bordeaux where the government had withdrawn. The text was read aloud. Reynaud

asked whether Churchill had approved it. Churchill grabbed the telephone and said something like "Hold on! De Gaulle is leaving now; he will bring yon the text. Everything can change with this proposal. Let us meet tomorrow in Concarneau". De Gaulle left by plane. Monnet was about to get on a train when he learnt that the French Prime Minister had resigned and that the defeatists in France had won the day. Petain had been chosen as the new Prime Minister. The London proposal then was received in Bordeaux in an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility. As Churchill said later, "rarely has so generous a proposal encountered such a hostile reception." According to Petain, what was being proposed was nothing less than "a union with a corpse".

Exceptional endeavour proposed by exceptional people in exceptional circumstances, which "could have changed the course of the war, the future of England and of Europe." A missed opportunity, but as Monnet would discover at the end of his life: "the extreme point of an action continuously striving towards the  unity of men".²

Paris, 1950 — The danger to Europe of a war with the Soviet Union was becoming more and more tangible. People spoke of unavoidable conflict. Jean Monnet felt that the cold war, which had for its essential objective to make the opponent give way, was the first phase of real war. The Americans wanted to strengthen the West and in this context it became imperative to secure a German contribution to the rebuilding of the European economy. This was viewed with suspicion by the French. France had been even trying to detach the rich region Saar from Germany. On the one hand, Germany was going to become a sovereign state and on the other hand each concession was made reluctantly. Germany was humiliated and became more and more impatient of restrictions imposed on her. France was afraid of a sovereign and free Germany. Monnet was worried: "Peace can be founded only on equality. We failed in 1919 because we introduced discrimination  and a sense of superiority. Now we are beginning to

mark the same mistakes again." Fortunately, two exceptional man, the Chancellor of Germany Konrad Adenauer and, in France, the Minister for External Affairs Robert Schuman³ were in the 'seats of power and open to a radical change of perspective. what could be done? Monnet left Paris and set out on a trek in the Alps as he was used to. There in the concentration of his silent march, he was constantly contemplating the same question: how to deeply implant a common interest between the two countries? When he came back to the capital, he knew what had to be done. "The course of events must be altered. To do this, men's attitudes must be changed. Words are not enough. Only immediate action on an essential point can change the present static situation. This action must be radical, real, immediate, and dramatic; it must change things and make a reality of the hopes which people are on the point of giving up."

Monnet sent a proposal to the Prime Minister Bidault and also to Schuman. Bidault filed away the paper in a drawer. Schuman was immediately convinced. It would be known as "the Schuman plan": a revolutionary proposal consisting in pooling together the coal and steel resources under an autonomous High Authority. What had been instrumental for making war was going to be instrumental for making peace. Schuman and Monnet then set out to work in close collaboration, outside of official diplomatic channels. They sent a message to Adenauer who rapidly made his acceptance known.⁴ On the 9th of May 1950 the proposal was made public. It was generally well received in France, except amongst the communists, the Right (because of the delegation of sovereignty) and the Gaullists (De Gaulle made fun of this ''mish-mash of coal and steel"). The German response was overwhelmingly in support of the idea. At the end of May, French and Germans met in Adenauer's office in Bonn. For the first time since the war', Adenauer would address the world without the intervention of the allied High Commission (still responsible for the affairs of Germany in this spring of 1950). Monnet had been very particular on this point: Germany had to discuss and decide 

as a sovereign nation. The two delegations came to an agreement The Chancellor declared: "Monsieur Monnet, I regard the implementation of the French proposal as my most important task. If I succeed, I believe that my life will not have been wasted." During the dinner hosted by the French embassy, "There were two ministers with Adenauer" remembered Paul Leroy Beaulieu, "Jean Monnet was coming towards them. The Chancellor then turned to me and said: please tell Mr Monnet that when I received his proposal, I thanked God.

       A breach in the ramparts of national sovereignty had been made thanks to this man, "able to wriggle the neck of History by creating institutionally irreversible situations".

1914, 1940, 1950. Three crucial dates. Three striking instances of an action which is each time different yet proceeds always from the same intention: to unite men, to solve the problems which divide them, to bring them to a common view; to show them that beyond their differences of opinion and despite whatever frontiers divide them, they have a common interest; to persuade them to see how they can pool together their resources, combine their efforts, merge their destinies — whether in times of war or in times of peace. In times of war but for the peace. In times of peace so that the war does not come back. Rarely has a single man who was neither a statesman nor a general nor even a celebrity, had such an influence on the course of international events. He did not know Sri Aurobindo, yet his whole life was dedicated to the ideal of human unity. What interested him, and even obsessed him, was not the ideal per se, but the construction, stone after stone, of this edifice. He rarely spoke in abstract terms. He spoke little of things that were outside his domain of action. He did not like high-sounding declarations. Yet here and there, in his notes jotted in his personal diary, the vision is there, clear, vast: 

The union of Europe is not an end in itself. It is a

contribution to the organization of peace in the world.

       The focus of our efforts should be the development  of man — not the affirmation of a motherland, whether big or small. 

       Why is the union of men restricted to national borders?⁵

and then, at the very end of his Memoirs, in the last page of his testament, this remark so moving in its simplicity, as if to half open a door before disappearing: 

Have I said clearly enough that the Community we have created is not an end in itself? It is a process of change, continuing that same process which in an        earlier period of history produced our national forms of life. Like our provinces in the past, our nations today must learn to live together under common rules and institutions freely arrived at. The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present: they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. And the Community itself is only a stage on the way to the organized world of tomorrow.⁶

One is reminded here of the men of the French revolution. They too at certain  moments could get a glimpse of the future world  that was to be born out of the huge upheaval whose first  jolts they had triggered.  In these moments of grace their voice also could find those simple but  sublime accents expressing the surprise and  emotion of those who realize that they have not worked in vain.

For a united world, for a deep transformation of the relation

between men and between countries, Monnet worked tirelessly with a total abnegation, putting aside all secondary preoccupation, all personal ambition. He viewed men without illusion but without pessimism. He was convinced that union was ineluctable and that we had only the choice "between changes towards which we will be forcibly dragged and changes which we will know how to prepare and realize". He was infinitely patient but when the opportunity to act was given to him, he pursued the action with a total concentration, without leaving any detail to chance, and with an impressive tenacity. He owed these virtues, he said, to his native soil, Charente, a region south-west of France.

He was born in Cognac in 1888 in a place where "one did one thing at a time slowly and with concentration"... "I can wait a long time for the right moment. In Cognac, they are good at waiting. It is the only way to make good brandy." Life interested the child much more than bookish knowledge. He stopped his studies after his first baccalaureate, and asked his father to allow him to work for the firm. At 16 he went to England to learn English. Knowing the language and the culture of the clients was very necessary for his trade. He stayed in a family of wine merchants, the firm's agents, and went to the City every morning. At 18 he went to Canada to develop the firm's retail network. There he acquired a taste for long walks: "the moment, or the means, for the concentration of mind that precedes action". He visited Sweden, Russia. In 1913, after a serious illness, he was found medically unfit for military service.

Then the first World War broke out. We have recounted Monnet's extraordinary visit to the Prime Minister's office. This young man did not consider for a second, that the men in power must have reflected on the problem of the lack of cooperation. between the Allies. He did not find it presumptuous to point at deficiencies and to suggest a course of action to experienced statesmen. "In a difficulty, never think that responsible men are

engaged in solving it If you find it necessary, see to it yourself." This first bold act in Bordeaux is already very typical of the Monnet's  way of functioning ; a reflection free from the preconceptions of the past, a tremendous confidence in the power of a simple idea, a clear perception of who is the man who has the capacity and opportunity  to implement it, a direct approach to contact this man, and finally a tireless work to bring everything to fruition. "I don't recall having ever thought: I want to do this or that with my life. Circumstances decided for me. In fact, I only know events. I must admit that they have never failed me. But in order to seize them, one must be well prepared."⁷  

Monnet stayed in London till the end of World War I.

He recounted in his Memoirs: 

Our small team was called upon to do miracles of improvisation, from day to day — whereas I never stopped insisting that only a joint overall organization could enable the German challenge to be met. But, as so often in my life, this simple idea had to go through a maze of complications — long and arduous discussions which seemed out of all proportion to what was at stake, and which might seem discouraging if I described them now. And yet to abandon a project because it meets too many obstacles is often a grave mistake: the obstacles themselves provide the friction to make movement possible. The more we went into the difficulties, the more it became clear that we must take decisions  together; and I myself never doubted that all our patient pressure and all our daily progress would come to fruition at the moment of maximum  danger, probably in the last stages of the war,. when there was no other choice than to be bold.⁸

engaged in solving it If you find it necessary, see to it yourself." This first bold act in Bordeaux is already very typical of the Monnet's  way of functioning ; a reflection free from the preconceptions of the past, a tremendous confidence in the power of a simple idea, a clear perception of who is the man who has the capacity and opportunity  to implement it, a direct approach to contact this man, and finally a tireless work to bring everything to fruition. "I don't recall having ever thought: I want to do this or that with my life. Circumstances decided for me. In fact, I only know events. I must admit that they have never failed me. But in order to seize them, one must be well prepared."⁷  

Monnet stayed in London till the end of World War I. He recounted in his Memoirs: 

Our small team was called upon to do miracles of improvisation, from day to day — whereas I never stopped insisting that only a joint overall organization could enable the German challenge to be met. But, as so often in my life, this simple idea had to go through a maze of complications — long and arduous discussions which seemed out of all proportion to what was at stake, and which might seem discouraging if I described them now. And yet to abandon a project because it meets too many obstacles is often a grave mistake: the obstacles themselves provide the friction to make movement possible. The more we went into the difficulties, the more it became clear that we must take decisions  together; and I myself never doubted that all our patient pressure and all our daily progress would come to fruition at the moment of maximum  danger, probably in the last stages of the war,. when there was no other choice than to be bold.⁸

In London Monnet began to build up an impressive network of relations which kept on expanding during all his life and which played a crucial role in his work. For instance, during these years in London Monnet worked in close collaboration with a young civil servant in the Transport department, named Arthur Softer. It is with this Salter, who by then had become Sir Arthur Salter that Monnet wrote the draft of the proposal of Anglo-French union in 1940.

The years following the Great War provided Monnet with yet another experience. The young man had been remarked for his role in the creation and functioning of inter-allied organizations. He was then chosen as Deputy to the League of Nations' Secretary General, Sir Eric Drummond. He set out to work on finding solutions to some problems (the question of Silesia, a region disputed by Poland and Germany, a financial package for Austria, etc) Monnet remembers:

Certainly, the organization which was set up, and which without major changes went on working in Geneva until 1939, did not always have the strength of its intentions. But in 1919 I was not looking at the system's weaknesses: it went as far as was possible at that time. To me it represented considerable progress, because through it we were beginning to change the relations between peoples. In those days, undoubtedly, I saw the problem of common authority differently from the way I see it today, because in 1919 the Allies saw the restoration of national sovereignty as the keystone of peace.⁹

Monnet was a voluntary optimist.

We developed habits of co-operation among nations which hitherto had known only relationships based

on power. We placed great hopes in the development  of the League, and the difficulties we encountered acted as a stimulus. It was only later that I realized how we had underestimated them, or rather how we had failed to dig deep enough. At the root of them all was national sovereignty. In the League Council, this prevented the general interests being seen. At every meeting, people talked about the general interest, but it was always forgotten along the way: everyone was obsessed by the effect that any solution would have on him — on his country. The result was that no one really tried to solve the actual problems: their main concern was to find answers that would respect the interests of all those around the table. In this way, the whole organization fell into the routine of mere cooperation. 

This was inevitable in a body subject to the unanimity rule. That rule seems natural to even the best-intentioned of men. One scene among others sticks in my memory: it was a meeting of the Council to discuss the world distribution of raw materials. The Italian representative, Marchese Impenale, was pressing for a certain decision to be taken. As usual, the British representative, Lord Balfour, looked as if he were asleep. When his turn came, he got up and said simply: "His Majesty's Government is against." Then he returned to his doze. The question was settled.¹⁰

Monnet tried to bring  some reasonableness into the question of the German reparations.  He had to face the intransigence of many  Frenchmen.  There was not much he could do. The problem lay in the  versailles  treaty ¹¹ which was based on discrimination. In spite of this the experience  was extremely instructive for Monnet. He  drew from it several lessons which influenced his

action till the end of his life:  

— a peace based, on inequality can have no good results "From the moment I first began to be concerned with public affairs, I have always realized that equality is absolutely essential in relations between nations, as it is between people."

— a mere co-operation between countries is not adequate for solving difficult problems

— an organization in which any decision can be blocked by the veto of one of its members will always be paralyzed.
— this organization can only have some power if the member states delegate to it a part of their sovereignty.

All those who worked with Monnet at the time were struck by his moral influence. Louis joxe, the future treasurer of the Free French, wrote in his book Victoires sur la Nuit, "all swore by Jean Monnet who was their guide and conscience." Nevertheless it became more and more obvious that the League of Nations was powerless, as the governments' main concern "was not to solve the actual problems but to safeguard, their own interest". 

In 1923, Monnet's family asked him to come back to Cognac as the firm was in great difficulty. He resigned from his post at the League of Nations. He modernized the enterprise, and after a few years its financial health was restored. But Cognac was too small now for this citizen of the world. He used to think in terms of international relations. Yet he did not return to public affairs. He plunged instead into finance. He had been approached by a large American investment firm which had just established a French subsidiary in Paris. So Monnet became an investment banker This job took him to the United States, to Poland, Romania, and even China, where he lived for almost two years in the company of the woman he had chosen as his wife. In 1929 this man who seemed to be so reasonable and level-headed experienced the great romantic adventure of this life: he fell in love with a beautiful Italian, much younger than him, married to an ltalian

businessman.. The divorce was forbidden in Italy. So the two lovers bunted by detectives hired by the ex-husband, had to live through  some fantastic incidents. The couple was only able to legally  marry m 1934 in Moscow, after devising a dangerous scheme: Silvia first took the Soviet nationality then she divorced unilaterally and then remarried. The risk of course was that Silvia would not be allowed to leave the Soviet Union. Fortunately everything went according to plan.

Monnet's first voyage to China was at the end of 1933. He was invited to make a plan of reconstruction that could attract international investments. He was helped by the fact that he had a close contact with Dr T.V. Soong, the brother-in-law of Tchang Kai-Ghek, the nationalist leader, and with his famous wife May Ling. He realised that it was impossible to rebuild the economy ofChina without an alliance between the foreign banks and the Chinese banks. This is what he did, creating a consortium of banks called China Finance Development Corporation. It developed  in a remarkable way and thanks to it several important railway lines could be financed.

In 1936 Monnet went back to the United States and settled there with his wife. Financial result: mediocre. Monnet had earned a lot of money and lost a lot. Fortunately, he had kept some shares in the cognac family business. Anyway his mind had become entirely preoccupied with the growing perils. When he heard of the anti-Jewish measures taken by Hitler, his reaction was immediate, 'A man who is capable of that will start a war. There are no limits to the spirit of discrimination and domination.  Monnet was extremely concerned about the weakness of the Allies in the matter of arms, especially aviation. He was convinced that there  was no other solution than to take help from the united  States to modernize the French aviation. The difficulties  were many. Extreme discretion was necessary, the Neutrality Act being still in force . Semi-finished products coming from the  States had to be built in Canada. Furthermore, the

French Foreign Minister did not want to release the funds. French industrialists protested against what they saw as an injustice  done to French industry, etc. Bullit, the American ambassador  in Paris, a great friend of Monnet, proposed that Monnet be sent to directly meet the American president. This would be the first meeting between Monnet and Roosevelt, a man whom he admired all his life. In spite of the openness of Roosevelt, things stagnated.

Then there was the crisis of Munich, in which the French and the British shamelessly surrendered to Hitler's demands and abandoned their ally Czechoslovakia. A few days later, Daladier, the French Prime minister and negotiator in Munich, told, Monnet, "If I had been in possession of three or four thousand planes, there would have been no Munich". Monnet was requested to again travel to America and try to place an order for one thousand planes, which were to be delivered at the end of July 1939. All these negotiations were conducted in secret because the isolationist current was still very strong in America. The whole affair was only possible thanks to Roosevelt. This effort would not be sufficient, of course, but at least Monnet had started to work on inter-allied co-operation.

In 1939 Monnet went back to Paris. First of all he was asked to deal with the problem of the debt that France owed the USA since World War I. This was a difficult topic that poisoned the relation between France and America. Jean Monnet was sent back to Washington in order to negotiate. A passage of a letter from Bullit to the American President is quite revealing of Monnet's reputation  "I hope you can meet him alone at the White House this evening. You can invite him for dinner or after dinner, it does not matter as this is a man without conceit. You will find him, as usual, completely honest intellectually and entirely discreet.... You  can speak to him without the least hesitation... there won't be any leak." Monnet's mission, conducted outside the official channels, was a success. France obtained a respite.

Then Monnet, conscious of the fact that war was imminent, set out to organize the cooperation between Allies. During a trip to London he suggested to make an assessment of the common resources and to create joint bodies having the power to find  solution  to the deficits. Monnet did not neglect anything in order to get the  agreement of the British. He even discreetly suggested to Bullit that he should ask Roosevelt to insist with the British on the need for a single Anglo-French purchasing service in America. Manipulation? For this man, whom de Gaulle was to call the Inspirer, nothing of what had to be done to reach the fixed goal was to be neglected. The Inspirer, the conspirator, the conjuror:  some people tried to diminish him with these words. True, Monnet could powerfully influence many statesmen. True, he "conspired" with the many collaborators, friends and accomplices who in many countries and in many different political parties were attracted to him. But the problem is not Monnet's action. The problem is that we cannot find a word which could be the positive  equivalent of the word "conspirator". He was conspiring indeed, but for the good of the people; he was conspiring for building a better future. This is what his conspiracy was about. .

In any case, Roosevelt accepted the suggestion and his advice was communicated to the British. An Anglo-French coordinating Committee was created with Jean Monnet as its Chairman. The British had as much confidence in him as the French had. So Jean Monnet saw the beginning of World War II in London. Then on the 16th of June 1940, he made that proposal of union between England and France which we described earlier.

After June 1940, de Gaulle and Monnet parted ways. For each of them the goal was clear although  it was slightly different. De Gaulle had to incarnate  Free France, the one that refused the surrender to the Germans.  Monnet wanted to put all his energies  at the service of the Allies  and their victory. The first endeavour is famous. The  second is less known but momentous nonetheless.

After the French collapse, Monnet discreetly saw to it that all the contracts of armaments signed by France were reverted to England and did not fall into the hands of the Germans. Then he wrote to Churchill, "I wish you to know ... that I should be extremely happy if the British government would give me the opportunity of serving it, and by doing so, of continuing to serve the true interests of my country.

"I therefore place my services at the disposal of the British government in such capacity as they can be most useful."

 Churchill sent him to the United States as member of the British Purchasing Commission (later to be called British Supply Council). Monnet then left London. His circle of friends in the US included many influential people, most of whom were Roosevelt's closest advisers. Justice Frankfurter, Stimson, the US War Secretary, his assistant John Mc Cloy, some journalists like Walter Lippmann, etc. All these men, fervently pro-Roosevelt, met regularly and informally; the fruit of their reflections was always communicated to the President. Of course, as far as the involvement of the US in the war was concerned, Roosevelt was restricted in his action by the law of Cash and Carry, according to which any country wanting to purchase equipment had to pay cash immediately. But Monnet insisted that without losing any more time an assessment be made of the armaments necessary to defeat the Germans and that a survey be taken of the available resources. He was actually surprised at the lack of preparation of the Americans. He wrote numerous notes and memoranda. "The surveys prepared on such basis are essential in order to determine if the programme of production now under way in the USA is sufficient to face the situation." Fortunately, Roosevelt was determined and conscious of what was at stake for the free world. He decided that the United States would lend England what she needed. Monnet was still not satisfied, "The United States of America will have to supply that which will allow England to surpass the German force in 1942. In order to have suitable equipment in 1942, this effort has to be decided, planned and started now. It has to be on such a scale that the supremacy and

victory in 1942 is possible. No human will, no imagination, and even no genius will be able to change the course of production during the year of 1942: it will be the result of the decisions taken now  itself." Monnet got to know Harry Hopkins, the great  confidant and collaborator of Roosevelt. Hopkins immediately listened to Monnet with a lot of interest. In the spring of 1941, Monnet prepared, with John McCloy, the instructions which the War department issued in order to get a comprehensive assessment of the Anglo-American resources. That assessment, in turn, would he compared with estimates of German power. "It is important to note that the problem must be dealt with from the point of view, 'What is the equipment we should have at the end of 1942 to surpass the German material force?' and not from the point of view, 'What is the equipment England and the US should have."

Monnet's influence on events during this period was out of proportion to his official position and many Americans testified to his role in the Victory Programme. After the war the well-known economist Keynes would say, "When the United States of America entered the war, Roosevelt was presented with an aircraft production programme which all the American experts thought would require a miracle. Jean Monnet was bold enough to find it inadequate.... The President came to agree with this point of view. He imposed on the American nation an effort which at first seemed impossible, but which later was completely fulfilled. This crucial decision may well have shortened the war by  a whole year." As for Robert Sherwood, Hopkins's collaborator and Monnet's friend, he said, "Monnet was the great, single-minded apostle of all-out production, preaching the doctrine that ten thousand tanks too many are far preferable to one tank  too few.''  Robert Nathan (member of Roosevelt's brain trust ) said, "When I met Jean Monnet for the first time, we had difficulty in assessing the needs  . We approximately knew what the military  wanted for the war, but we did not know what precise quantities of iron  and aluminum we had to have. When Jean Monnet arrived, he tackled the problem head-on. He wanted to

know everything about American production. ... He kept on  pestering us. We knew since long that he was closely connected with those whose mission was to prepare the war at the highest level, and we admired his skill of organization. He was the most determined man that one could imagine. No obstacle was insurmountable for him. Ceaselessly, he kept harassing people from the British side as well as from the American side. In the end, he was right and the technicians were wrong. If calculated only on the needs of the defense and needs of Lend Lease, the objectives, if we had listened to the experts, would have been limited till Pearl Harbour." 

To assess the needs, to make a balance-sheet was a very important element in Monnet's strategy. Francois Fontaine, a close collaborator of Monnet, spoke very eloquently of how Monnet made use of numbers and figures:

The first need was stock-taking. This stock-taking is an exercise which the civil and military powers are not able to do. They prefer to launch armies till exhaustion of material and men. The stock-taking then is made by subtracting. The genius of Jean Monnet was to wage the battle of figures, to force the resistance of the bureaucracy, to push the services to their extreme point. Then he compressed the mass of data till he could fit them on one single page. The real situation then appeared and it was telling in its simplicity. For any responsible  mind, which action should follow was obvious. [...] Tomorrow a new generation of historians probably will recognize the role, equal to that or great captains, of a few men without decoration and often without a mandate who conceived and built the arsenal of democracies. Which Nazi spy paid attention to these few civilians who ceaselessly demanded figures which were provide to theme

reluctantly  and then worked on feverishly day and night? Which intelligence service was interested in lean Monnet, Arthur Purvis, Bob Nathan? An Albert Speer [Hitler's advisor] did not know till the end that his gigantic plans would be beaten by a Frenchman, invisible in the shadow of civil servants, themselves hidden in the shadow of Roosevelt. He would not have given 10 dollars for a piece of squared paper where a balance-sheet looking like that of a hardware merchant showed "the gap", the difference that had to be bridged in order to save the free world. This piece of paper exists. Monnet sometimes would take it out of a safe as if it were still a great secret. ¹²

One of the most amazing aspects of Monnet's activities in Washington is that the British themselves, whenever they had some problems with the Americans, would always use Monnet as a go-between, sending him to Hopkins, and... "the trick never failed", as recounted Hoyer-Millar from the British Embassy. The British were only too aware that Monnet knew better than them how this government worked. In fact it is not only the Americans who praised Monnet for his role in the Victory program , many Britishers recognized how central he was in the war effort. Leslie Chance, secretary of the British Supply council wrote, "For the best part of two years, to my certain knowledge, almost every major move in the Anglo-American supply  sttuation in Washington, that is. in the realm of policy, had  its genesis  in this little  French head. The victory programme, the raising of the famous speech of the President when he told the number of tanks airplanes and what not that were going to be built the idea of the  combined Boards — all that was Monnet ''¹³  After the 'war Lord Halifax was to write that Monnet was ''with such as Harry  Hopkins, one of the real architects of our victory."

November 1942. The Allies landed in North Africa. In February 1943 Jean Monnet was sent by Roosevelt to Algiers ostensibly to look after the rearmament of French troops in Africa, but in reality to attempt reconciliation between Giraud ¹⁴ the general supported by the Americans, and the chief of the Free French in London, de Gaulle. So here was Monnet, a French citizen at the service of Great Britain and sent on a mission by the American President, This was not a man confined to frontiers, nor to narrow loyalties. Yet Monnet was loyal to the goal he gave himself, loyal to the cause of peace.  

And indeed he was perfectly loyal to his native country. Monnet first tried to negotiate between Algiers and London. The situation was extremely difficult due to the stubbornness of both sides. Nothing less than the unity of France was at stake in those days in Algiers. Finally a Committee of National Liberation was formed. Monnet hoped that its authority would make the personal quarrels disappear. But it became rapidly obvious that Giraud had no political stature. Finally, he had to hand over his power to de Gaulle. The Americans were not very happy that Monnet facilitated this handover, Monnet calmly told them that he did not have to brief them about questions of internal French politics. That settled the matter.

This man, entirely concentrated on his goal, indifferent to personal ambition, attentive to judge things free from all personal preferences and opinions, reminds us of a great yogi. A surprising yogi, indeed, in a grey suit and a felt hat, but who except a yogi could set for himself the following rule: "Never let a question take a personal form"? It might be objected that many philosophers or moralists wrote similar maxims. Yes, indeed, but only yogis put them into practice.

In this year 1943 in Algiers, Monnet already saw ahead of the Committee of National Liberation and even ahead of the of the war. He was already preoccupied with the after-war, and was

wondering what Europe would do with its peace. During the summer of 1943 be elaborated a whole program to be realize after the war and noted it down in  his personal diary:

        We have to make Frenchmen aware of the idea of Europe and the World. There is no salvation but in an international solution of the problems. There is no  greatness for France except in universal views. It is not a question of prestige. It is a question of contribution. Contribution to the solution of the German problem. Contribution to the reorganization  of Europe.

And,

        There will be no peace in Europe if the States are formed again on the basis of national sovereignty with all that it entails of politics of prestige and economic protection.

He felt that the weakened and humiliated France, if she remembered her soul, if she remembered her tradition of universality  could and must play a great role in the preservation of peace . Some people would make fun of Monnet's "supra-national theories" (actually Monnet never liked the expression "supranational ) but no one was more conscious of the specific genius of each nation than he.

Monnet spend the rest of the   spent  war in Washington, , where he worked on the supply of  essential commodities for France. He  also tried to convince the Americans to recognize de Gaulle and the committee of National Liberation. This would only be obtained in 1944,Monnet ,who would latter be called by certain  critics ''the great American '', also insisted that the currency to be used in  France after the liberation should be a French currency in reality, nothing would be  further from Monnet's approach

 than to agree to a relation that would not be based on equality.

After the war, Monnet met de Gaulle in Washington. Monnet  remarked on the industrial and economic backwardness of France, and the need for modernizing. De Gaulle agreed and immediately gave him the charge of a "Plan of modernization and equipment". Monnet would be answerable only to the Prime Minister. His idea was that France did not have only to be reconstructed, but it had at the same time to be modernized. His other key-idea was that all the forces of the nation must be made to participate. For drawing the Plan, he gathered economists, industrialists, trade-union leaders, scientists, farmers and made them work together. At that time one did not speak yet of interdisciplinary methods, so this way of working was surprisingly novel. It was a very intense and always renewed activity. Monnet knew how to keep the initial enthusiasm alive, and avoid mechanical ways of working. "Modernization is not a state of things; it is a state of mind." It was called the Plan, but as Francois Fontaine remembered, K Monnet preferred to say that it was a living reality. He planned its growth and successive steps according to a design which he considered evident only as long as a greater evidence had not appeared. The adaptability was also included in the programme so that at any given time he could say 'we are going the wrong way' or 'we under-estimated the difficulty'." Around Monnet was an exceptional team of young men, most of them met during the war. Some of these would remain at his side for along time, first for the preparation of the Schuman plan, then at the headquarters of ECSC at Luxembourg, and in the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Francois Fontaine  still remembers,

Which method of persuasion could ever replace Monnet's? Its secret disappeared with him. Neither the magic of words, nor an imposing majesty, nor the power of money have yielded as much influence as the slightly muffled voice, insisting but

devoid of dramatic effects, of this man who was smaller than most of his interlocutors. He used to catch hold  of them and lead them into the embrasure   of a window. Sometimes his hands were in the pockets of his jacket, but more often they were placed on your arm so as to make you, too, feel prisoner of the necessity.  "Believe me... Do not be mistaken. There is no other way out". These warnings  which had been repeated a hundred times did not wear out. On the contrary, they had been borne out a hundred times by experience. At the Rue de Martignac [address of the building which housed the Commissariat au Plan] the argument was simple: "Modernisation or decadence". Where was the choice? It was an injunction. Jean Monnet always practised the false alternative. But before setting his mind and his will, he had ceaselessly pondered over the problem. "I reflect for a long time, I convince myself. Once I am convinced, I act." He expressed the same idea differently: "An essential rule of conduct is to know what one thinks." He never advocated a course of action unless he had duly pondered over the matter and he had been convinced in front of his own consciousness...¹⁵

In 1950 Monnet was aged 62 when the proposal made to schuman was drafted at Rue de Martignac. This proposal, coming so soon after the end of the !war' consisted, as we saw above in pooling together  the production of coal and steel of France and Germany under  a common High Authority, in an organization open to the participation of other countries of  Europe, if was the fruit of Monnet's continuous and a  string  example of his method. first, when a problem is difficult  change the context.

 I had come to see that it was often useless to make a frontal attack on problems, since they have nor arisen by themselves, but are the product of circumstances. Only by modifying the circumstances — "lateral thinking" — can one disperse the difficulties that they create. So, instead of wearing myself out on the hard core of resistance, I had become accustomed to seeking out and trying to change whatever element in its environment was causing the block. Sometimes it was quite a minor point, and very often a matter of psychology. The problem of Germany, vast and complex though it was, could surely be approached in this same way, It would certainly not be solved until we had changed the conditions that made the future of the Germans so uncertain and disquieting, for their neighbours as for themselves. From the German point of view, those conditions included the humiliation of being subject to indefinite Allied control'; from the French point of view, there was the fear of a Germany ultimately freed from any control at all. These two elements were by no means the only ones on the world scene at that time; but they were enough to block any constructive  evolution in Europe.¹⁶

The second element which was of prime importance in, Monnet's approach was to use obstacles as footholds in order .to  progress. (Monnet had been extremely impressed by a sentence read in a book on Ibn Saud, "For me everything is a means, even obstacles."). In fact what interested Monnet was not the coal and the steel, but the fact that coal and steel could become "a means'' or a lever in order to lift circumstances, and to change the  mentalities. Monnet later said in an interview that all European  development was contained in the Schuman Plan and the European   Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), including very

important point , the delegation of sovereignty.

For the  first time, countries would delegate a part of their sovereignty to an external body — which had the mandate and the power to take  decisions as well as financial autonomy. Actually  Monnet , contrary to what a politician might have done, far form  reducing the import of his proposal, saw to it that there was on  ambiguity at all. "Yes;' he kept repeating, "The Schuman proposals are revolutionary or they are nothing". The governments  had to understand very clearly that they were going to abandon apart of their national sovereignty.

In June 1950, the conference of the six countries having accepted the Schuman plan, opened in Paris. Monnet spoke, listened, repeated, dispelled fears. He knew that his proposal raised a lot of questions, but he also knew that these would be solved if people learnt to "think differently", that is to say, not as French or German or Dutch defending specific interests, but as members of a group keeping in mind the common good. Monnet did not even want that these discussions be labeled "negotiations" as this word implies a compromise between people having different interests. He asked the participants to let go of the habit of speaking of a German or French or Italian steel industry since henceforth there would only be a European steel industry.

Monnet, a good pedagogue, knew he had to teach through example.   During the whole conference, he spoke only as a European preoccupied with the common future. As his team consisted of man trained by him, it was  remarked at the time that the French delegation was in fact a real European delegation.  Monnet kept reminding everyday that the object of the conference was to lay the foundations for a European federation many objections were raised of course , especially concerning the powers of the  High Authority listened to proposals which he considered because these  aimed at limiting the power of the new institutions. He was very flexible but never

yielded on the fundamental principle of the proposal. He kept repeating simple ideas, like this one, "Until you have tried you can never tell whether a task is impossible or not.

Italian Paolo Emilio Taviani, leader of the Christian Democracy  and a participant in that conference recalls, "The determining factor in the success of the negotiation was Jean Monnet's personality. ... Like De Gasperi¹⁷ and contrary to Churchill, Monnet at first sight was not very impressive. Only gradually die one come to realize that he was a genius. Different in this from the Latin people, his aim was not to seduce but to convince. And for this, his main weapon was lunch. He would invite me, always tete-a-tete, and the menu would always be the same: a soup, a sole and an ice-cream. Then ceaselessly he would develop his arguments.... This is how De Gasperi was totally convinced.¹⁸

When one thinks of the mass of technical and psychological obstacles that had to be surmounted, the number of people that had to be convinced, one marvels that this endeavour could succeed. When a journalist asked Monnet at the end of his life how he managed to materialize his projects, he simply answered, "You underestimate the importance of an idea." Of course none  had worked harder than Monnet for that idea not to remain at  the stage of the idea. The same journalist insisted, "When one listens to you, one is under the impression that everything works out alright in the end." Monnet gently corrected, "It works out alright in the end if somebody takes care of it."

Later the project of a joint European army failed due to the treaty being voted down by the French parliament. Monnet had been the "inspired of this proposal, although he himself  had felt that it was premature to put it forward. It would be extremely difficult, Monnet thought, to transform the minds on something seen as so fundamental. The army with its external signs, the uniform, the flag, etc., touches at the core of national sovereignty and is one of its most sacred symbols. Moreover, for putting in

place a common army, there should have been more progress made in  the way of political union, which was not the case yet. but  international events had taken over. In June 1950 at the very  beginning of the conference of the Six at Paris, North Korea had invaded south Korea. The Americans insisted on a greater German  participation in the defense of Europe. The idea of a German army was unacceptable to the French. Monnet felt that there was no alternative to a European joint army. This is why in spite of his other preoccupations he used his closeness with Rene Pleven the new Prime Minister, to discreetly send him many letters as well as a draft for a proposal. It is this declaration prepared by Monnet which Pleven read before the French Parliament and which was transformed into a treaty in 1952. Unfortunately, this treaty got stuck for too long in the sands of international diplomacy and was tabled in the French Assembly only in 1953. Monnet by then was fully absorbed by his responsibilities  as President of the High Authority at Luxembourg and could not follow the project as closely as he wanted. In 1954 after the French refusal to sign the treaty, the whole project of the European Defense Community would be abandoned. Monnet was extremely disappointed but he drew lessons from this failure, ''Once again, I had to explain to my friends that the only true defeats are those that one accepts. We had underestimated the strength of the nationalist current; and perhaps it was salutary to have taken its measure at the flood. We now needed time to build more solidly. indeed when ever he mate  obstacles in a progression  that he considered as ineluctable, Monnet's determination was impressive. Francois  Fontaine recount how on certain occasion his collaborators were filled with dismay at a particular setback But when they asked Monnet, '' so what is to be done new. Monnet looked at you with the air of surprises and reproach which  he had while listening to useless questions Continue, of course. What else.?''¹⁹

In 1950, Monnet become the president of High Authority of the  ECSO and took up residence in Luxembourg. In his office

he hang on a wall, visible from all sides, the photo of a famous raft which had crossed the Pacific, the Kon Tiki.²⁰" The symbol was clear: once we embark, we will not be able to turn back. "There is only one solution", he used to say, "continue to move on". On the 10th of August 1952, in the name of his eight colleagues assembled  around him, he had taken an oath of independence (similar more or less to the oath all the European commissioners would take later): "We shall carry out our tasks in full independence, in the general interest of the community. In fulfilling our duties, we shall neither solicit nor accept instructions from any government or any other body and we shall refrain from any action incompatible  with the supra-national character of our tasks. We have noted the member States' pledge to respect this supra-national character and not try to influence us in our work." The formulation went so much against all the ancient ways of thinking that even 50 years later one is astonished that this oath could have been accepted.

 Immediately after the inauguration, work began. The rhythm imposed by Monnet was unbelievable, "He did not care about our schedule," one of his secretaries remembers, "the very evening of my engagement, for instance, he had decided to distribute a document in Brussels. He absolutely wanted me to do it; he had planned everything, had gotten the train timetables, etc., so that I could not get away." There were rumours saying that one day a jurist collapsed from a heart attack in his office, and in Luxembourg the people called the headquarters of the High Authority "the mad house" because lights were always switched on at night.

In any case, Monnet saw to it that people from diverse nationalities, specially French and German, worked together, even if for this he had to make them sit together in cramped offices. He never forgot that his most important task was to defend the independence of the High Authority vis-a-vis the States. From the beginning, the High Authority was confronted

with thorny issues, which had the potentiality to bring down the whole structure — the question of prices, for instance, or the problem of taxes. These obstacles were surmounted one by one. Some important progress was made concerning social measures. But the main achievement of Monnet was to create a common state of mind and gather in Luxembourg a team of civil servants who believed in the European idea. He remembered how much the visitors were surprised when they discovered a team of nine people speaking in four languages, "Our day trippers went away with the feeling that they had seen pioneers at work, and when they returned home they helped spread the word. Their repeated and consistent travellers' tales fed the legend that a new race of men was emerging in the Luxembourg institutions, as if in a laboratory..."²¹

But after the failure of the EDC (European Defence Community)  in 1954, Monnet realised that the European project may be arrested if one did not "take care of it" and that his functions in Luxembourg did not allow him to pursue the wider project. He wanted to be entirely free to participate in the European construction on a large scale. This is why in 1954 he resigned from his post in Luxembourg. It was for him the beginning of "a struggle of another kind". For this, he wanted to lean on the forces he saw as indispensable, those without which he could not do anything but with which he could do everything, that is to say the political parties and the trade unions. In October 1955, Monnet created the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. He would remain President of this private organisation till 1975. The aim of the Committee was to keep the idea of Europe alive and initiate or encourage actions that led to the concretization.  It was understood that those who signed up for being members of this Committee did not represent only themselves but also their political group. In the Committee there were many people who had been in power in the past, who would come back to power and should be able to influence men and governments. It was a very original creation. In fact, in this Committee, there

were political parties that opposed each other in their own country but which united on the subject of Europe. Monnet travelled incessantly all over Europe to prepare with these men the text of the future resolutions of the Committee. Once a resolution was passed, all the members would actively push in their own circles for its implementation. For twenty years, thanks to his incessant travels and visits, Monnet wove a very tight fabric of collaboration and good will. Nothing was left to chance. He himself would hand over the document to the person it was addressed to, checking the movement of a letter from one person to another. Recalling the beginning of his collaboration with the young Rene Pleven (a future French Prime minister), Monnet remarked in his Memoirs,

It took him some time to agree to rewriting ten or twenty times a note "of secondary importance" whose text was "more or less satisfactory". In fact, nothing that has to be done to attain one's aim is "secondary". Nothing should be an approximation accepted out of tiredness or the lateness of the hours. Pleven also had to learn that to write a letter is not enough: one has to be sure that it has been sent, and to check that it has arrived. Failing observance  of these rules, which are not merely details or minor matters, people who are thought to be conscientious are surprised when the results they achieve fall short of their intentions.²²

Francois Fontaine says, "Nobody has ever understood how with three collaborators and a few secretaries Monnet could be more active and stir more reflections than huge parliamentary institutions... No expert has yet understood how on his own an old man could bridge the distance that separated an Italian socialist from a British conservative, a Dutch anti-revolutionary from a German social-democrat, and all these politicians on one side from trade unionists on the other side."²³ Monnet's

organisation was very flexible, and used a variety of methods to reach its aim. The commitment which was asked from Monnet's colleagues was total, but the confidence he inspired was proportional to the involvement he demanded.

One has to stress here the fact that this man who could directly approach many great leaders in the world was entirely disinterested. "The extraordinary power of Jean Monnet," said Jean Laloy, "came from his absolute disinterestedness. People knew that he never asked anything for himself." Recalling his work for the Victory Program in America, Monnet said,

I have never tried to work in fields outside my experience — although there are many which I might have been induced to enter, if I had not always followed the rule of doing only one thing at a time. It seemed natural to try to convince Churchill, Roosevelt, and Hopkins personally, in that the most direct way to get things done was to go through them — as in the case of Viviani, Millerand, and Clemenceau twenty-five years earlier... People knew that I wanted nothing for myself, and that I was not looking for a job — which enabled me to be both insistent and demanding.²⁴

This restraint did not concern only material gain, but also the demands of the ego:

Over and over in my life, I have seen joint organization  and action blocked by questions of persons. I have never been able entirely to avoid such obstacle,  or to overcome them. But I have always refused to regard them as preconditions, and I have dwelt on them only when I have been forced to, after exhausting every possibility of dealing first

with questions of principle and method. This rule, obviously enough, applies in the first instance to myself. Seeking no job and no favours, I have never been embarrassed to ask other people to be a little unselfish or modest — or, more simply, to be reasonable.²⁵

After the end of World War II, Monnet was tempted to enter politics to express his ideas. But he did not hesitate for long. In full agreement with his wife Silvia, he decided to remain outside politics: first, he could work only in one field and concentrate on one problem at a time, while a politician had to consider a range of problems at the same time. Secondly, he could never follow the line of a party, as he could convince other people only if he was convinced himself. Moreover, he knew he was not a good orator. But this apparent infirmity (for somebody who wanted "to change the minds of men") was turned around by Monnet and made into a unique asset. For indeed the politician is not the ideal person to bring about changes in society, even assuming that he has any intention of doing so. He is slowed down in his effort by many considerations, and first of all by the necessity to stay in power. In fact, "if governments and civil services were always ready to change the existing order of things from one moment to the next, the result would be continual revolution and incessant disorder." Change can only "come from outside". Therefore Monnet would not be a politician — and since he would not be, he would be the one who makes the change happen. He would be the one who brings proposals to politicians at times of difficulties when the men in power don't know any more what is to be done and accept with gratitude a solution that is offered to them. This position would be the most efficient one for the type of work he wanted to do:

If there was stiff competition around the centres of power, there was practically none in the area where I wanted to work — preparing the future, which by

definition is outside the glare of present publicity. Since I did not get in statesmen's way, I could count on their support. Moreover, although it takes a long time to reach the men at the top, it takes very little to explain to them how to escape from the difficulties  of the present. This is something they are glad to hear when the critical moment comes. Then when ideas are lacking, they accept yours with gratitude — provided they can present them as their own. These men, after all, take the risks; they need the kudos. In my line of work, kudos has to be forgotten. I have no particular taste for secrecy, despite what some people say; but if I can best expedite matters by self-effacement, then I prefer to work behind the scenes.²⁶

Monnet's obscurity was not the darkness that protects the manipulator. It was a voluntary transparency that lets the essential be perceived.

Monnet was in search of something that was not easy to define, but which he saw as a deeper involvement for the European peoples. We find a hint of this research in his personal diary,

18th of August 1956

I worked on creating institutions, thinking that institutions brought people closer — like ECSC, like Euratom. It is true, and it must be the final goal — but this is not the method because institutions for coal and steel become institutions for coal and steel and not for men. In order to go further, one has to touch the life and the interest of the people.²⁷

Or later,

One must touch the political and human motivation, , not only the technical.

At the same time, as all men entirely devoted to their mission and pushed by something greater than themselves, Monnet was obsessed with a sense of urgency. He wrote in his notebooks, "To go ahead without giving anyone the time to regain one's breath." Europe must be formed more quickly; it had to become a reality that would be more visible and closer to everybody's life. Finally, in 1957 the Treaty of Rome was signed, which instituted the Common Market. In this negotiation Monnet did not play any particular role, but his Committee had in fact prepared a good deal of the proposal, especially as far as the general objective was concerned. Then Monnet played an important role in the ratification of the treaty by the different parliaments.

In 1958 de Gaulle came back to power. That was the beginning  of a difficult period for Monnet. De Gaulle had opposed not only the ECSC but also the European Defence Community and the Common Market. He claimed that he was in favour of Europe, but his conception was of a "Europe of States"; according  to him that was the only Europe possible "except, of course, for myths, fictions, and pageants". This conception was quite different from Monnet's, one in which Europe would become a kind of federation. De Gaulle made fun of "certain more or less extra-national bodies". Monnet was a pragmatic man and also an optimistic man, so first he thought that many of de Gaulle's remarks were part of a public posture. He accepted very well the fact that men in power had to take certain lines with the aim of strengthening their public image. But de Gaulle insisted on taking certain actions which in Monnet's view were detrimental to the construction of Europe. For instance, in 1962 de Gaulle tried to dilute certain proposals aimed at creating a beginning of European political union. In 1963 he opposed the entry of Great Britain into Europe, on considerations which according to Monnet were "finally secondary". Monnet had worked a lot for

the integration of Great Britain into Europe. He knew her ambiguities  vis-a-vis the project but, we said it already, he was an optimist, or rather, as he said himself, "I am not an optimist. I am only determined." He had observed the temperament of the English people, he knew that they were pragmatic and even flexible. He knew that they would join when they saw that the experiment was a success. He considered that his own role was precisely to see that nothing was compromised on the essential principles. But this was going to take some more time.

In 1965, a serious crisis erupted in the Common Market about agricultural policies, and the French withdrew from the meetings. This episode, known as the "politics of the empty chair", is considered the darkest period in the history of the European community. Actually, during all this period Monnet showed that he was amazingly flexible, and he did whatever he could to help arrive at a compromise (called the compromise of Luxembourg) — which brought back to Brussels the French delegation. Meanwhile, during the presidential campaign of 1965, for the first time he publicly took position against de Gaulle's views concerning Europe, terming them "out of date".

In reality those two great men had a lot of things in common. First of all, Monnet admired de Gaulle a lot, especially for his role during World War II. Both men had fought against fascism. Both of them long before other people had perceived the insatiable appetite of the Nazis. Both of them wanted to give their countries strong institutions, both of them wanted to make France a modern and well organized State. Both of them were disinterested.  The views of both combined idealism and realism. The great difference between them was their idea of the nation, and the role that it would play in the future of humanity. For de Gaulle, nothing was higher than the nation. This. was a fundamental and sacred notion. For Monnet the unit "nation-state" was a transitional stage in history; it was not a permanent necessity. Under the pressure of events, the idea of a purely

national power was bound to disappear. The greatness of France could not be dissociated from the greatness of a larger unit, that of Europe. Those who would cling to a notion of solitary power would get isolated and would lose their influence. They could only be influenced by other great units, or other civilizations, but they would not be able to contribute much.

So the years between 1962 and 1969 were a time when Monnet felt constricted in his action, especially in France. But in spite of these difficulties and maybe because of these difficulties — which showed that Europe was a yet fragile plant in need of a careful gardener —, Monnet used his influence and his prestige (which paradoxically had never been so great)²⁸ to work towards strengthening Europe. Things got easier for him — and for Europe — when de Gaulle quit in 1969.

Monnet was now 80 but his only concern was the future. People insisted that he should write his Memoirs. He had asked friend and historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle to help him, but he was not sure whether he really wanted to do it. Duroselle remembers, "He was so much focussed on the present and turned towards the future that he could not concentrate on his book. He even told me one day, 'Couldn't we conceive of Memoirs which would be about the future?'"²⁹ Finally the Memoirs were written after he retired, when he had more time, and after he understood that the book could be useful for the men of the future.

The 80-year-old man traveled incessantly throughout Europe to push things, unblock the situation when it was necessary, and see to it that the construction of Europe did not-slow down, and became wider and deeper. His relations with the German Chancellor Willy Brandt were excellent and facilitated things in a great measure. In 1969, Monnet was happy to realize that the proposals made by the conference of La Haye dealing with economic and monetary union originated in the work of his Action Committee.

Monnet's way of working was either to speak directly to a statesman if he was a friend, or to enter in contact with someone close to him and try to convince him. All the people who have seen Monnet at work agree: he had a very exceptional skill for perceiving who, near the seat of power, could be receptive to his ideas and could transmit them to his superiors — and not only in France (this was relatively easy) but in any country. Jean-Rene Bernard, a young diplomat who during the presidency of Pompidou had many conversations with Monnet, said, "I had a lot of admiration for this old man who was at the same time a kind of apostle, an apparatchik and a magician and someone who had a lot of practical, sense. He was a very extraordinary man, and, in my view, there was something religious about his approach. I never knew what was Jean Monnet's philosophy but it was clear for me that his project of human unity, for which Europe after all was only a stepping stone, was quite similar to Christianity."³⁰

Of course this way of functioning implied that Monnet at a given time could have access to the leaders in power, either, directly or through their subordinates. It meant that his credit with them should never —and that is obvious — be misused for asking a personal favour, but also never used for something of secondary importance. On the contrary, when the moment had come, that person would be besieged by Monnet without mercy. This work implied too that Monnet should be well prepared in advance with clear ideas.

I have never sat down to discuss anything without having a draft before me —and I care very little whether it be the first or the only text. It is at least our contribution. If the others accept it because it seems the best, or for any other reason, so much the better. To tell the truth, our suggestions have often been accepted in the absence of any competition. Generally, people come to the table

empty-handed, out of either circumspection or sloth. In their hearts, they are pleased to find that a paper has been produced overnight. To produce it means staying up late.³¹

Monnet was called by one of his biographers, Eric Roussel, a "pragmatic visionary". And indeed this visionary did not lack common sense. For instance in 1973, he proposed a plan for political union. It was a very pragmatic plan, because Monnet had realized that it was difficult to make people agree to the idea of a merger of sovereignty. A note concerning this project reveals his down-to-earth approach. "... the commission could work in two different manners. Either describe what should be a European political authority, or describe what it can be.³² The commission chose the second way. It is easy to describe what an authority should be, but it would be a theoretical exercise, it would not be in keeping with the tradition of our Committee. The committee has always supported the organization of a united Europe by proposing concrete measures, which, step by step, would lead to a European organization."

The word "concrete" is a word often used by Monnet. Indeed it is the obstinacy of an idealist combined with the suppleness of a man tuned into the reality that makes Monnet so fascinating as a person. For Monnet, human unity was something one had to build with the help of ships and goods, with coal and steel, with francs and marks, through many drafts ceaselessly worked upon, and after a lot of effort put into discovering a common view. It was something to be built step by step, without discouragement nor illusion. It was something to build through successes and through obstacles. "I am not an optimist. I am only determined." The goal was clear but the way which would lead to it was unknown; it was impossible to predict the twists and turns or how much time it would take. Monnet used to say, "To anticipate the result blocks the spirit of invention. As we ascend we will discover the new horizons." He used images which were familiar

to him because he was used to trekking in the mountains. Sometimes he used the symbol of the Kon Tiki, a raft launched in the Pacific ocean and which could not go back. Actually while Monnet was sure about the goal to reach, he never precisely defined the exact form that Europe would take. "To envisage today the final form of the European community which we wanted as a process of change is a contradiction in terms."³³

Change was something central to Monnet's thoughts. His collaborator of many years Van Helmont remarked: "In his life and in his mind, change was inscribed as the supreme law. He wanted change and accepted the resulting disorder, although he had no inclination for upheavals."³⁴ At the same time Monnet was convinced that a true change could only be gradual. Those who spoke of a global change were doing precisely this: speaking about it. All those who worked to bring out changes had to reflect on the future consequences. They had to progress "by little steps" and consciously.

At the beginning of 1975 after an illness, the doctors advised Monnet against travelling. It also had become obvious by then that the Action Committee for the United States of Europe had fulfilled its mission for a large part. It was time for Monnet to withdraw. On the 9th of May 1975,³⁵ Monnet ceased to work as the President. The Committee itself was dissolved. Monnet withdrew to his house outside of Paris and soon afterwards started to write his Memoirs. He understood that his experience could be useful to other people. "When one has accumulated a certain experience of action, to try to hand it on to others is also a form of action and one day the time comes when the best thing one can do is teach others what seems to be right." For this work Monnet was helped by a very close collaborator, Francois Fontaine. Fontaine gives here the deep meaning of this masterly book,

He did not write the Memoirs out of pride or for

justifying himself, much less to entertain or astonish people, but to prolong his action, after being sure that he could do it. The publishers and their "ghost writers" wanted something else, they wanted the story of a life full of adventures and picturesque anecdotes. People knew he did not write, so he would be asked to speak and they would publish these conversations which had moved so many things and so many people. It took years to rectify this misunderstanding. He refused all offers until he was sure that the underlying unity of his life could be expressed in a coherent book, without literary artificialities. It is at that point, — he was eighty-five years old — that he discovered the thread linking all his diverse activities  — that thread which held together Europe and the modernisation of France, the union of the French during the war and the Victory Program, the allied Committees of 1940 and those of 1914. He understood that he had to go further back,, till Cognac with which his destiny was tied up. There he found the memory of the family dining-room and along with it he recovered the elements that were missing for the making of a painting still vague in his mind. In fact, he was not absolutely sure that his life had been lived with singleness of purpose. "I had no alternative", he used to say. That was inadequate. When he got a more complete view of the painting, and when some order was put in the chronology, he understood that he had always tried to do the same thing:  unite men.
To unite them for peace, for utilizing better the resources of nature, yes, if one considers the final goal. But he hesitated a lot before using big words. He saw himself as a practitioner. He did the things

that had to be done in order to solve the crisis of the day, and for this he only needed opportunities. ... One does not spend one's whole time in uniting people! "And yet this is what we have done," said Jean Monnet with surprise when he paused to look back. "Was not our method, whatever the problem, to urge men to meet so that they could talk of the same thing and they could perceive their common good?" Only when he was convinced that this method had always been his and that it was applicable  between peoples and between various social groups or individuals, did he decide to write his Memoirs.³⁶

In 1977 in a very unusual ceremony in his house at Houjarray, Monnet was awarded the honorary citizenship of Europe, an award which had never been given before. In 1979, Monnet, cared for by his dear Silvia, died at the age of 90, After a ceremony attended by all the main leaders of European States, he was buried in the small cemetery of Bazoches.

Later the French realized that they had not been very fair to the man Kennedy called a "statesman of the world", and about whom Francois Valery (the famous poet Paul Valery's son) could say, "Few men have enjoyed so little power and yet exerted so much influence, and one that was so lasting." They realized that they did not know him very well. They started to recognize his role and pay homage to the Frenchman people called "the father of Europe", In 1988 the French President proposed to transfer his mortal remains to the Pantheon, the monument where lay so many great men. Jean Monnet then would rest close to Victor Hugo, another visionary who one century earlier had prophesized,

All of us here, we say to France, to England, to Prussia, to Austria, to Spain, to Italy, to Russia, we

say to them, "A day will come when your weapons will fall from your hands, a day when war will seem absurd and be as impossible between Paris and London, St. Petersburg and Berlin, Vienna and Turin, as today it would seem impossible between Rouen and Amiens, Boston and Philadelphia."  A day will come when there will be no battlefields, . but markets opening to commerce and minds opening to ideas. A day will come when the bullets and bombs are replaced by votes, by universal suffrage, by the venerable arbitration of a great supreme senate which will be to Europe what Parliament is to England, the Diet to Germany, and the Legislative Assembly to France. A day will come when a cannon will be a museum piece, as instruments of torture are today. And we will be amazed to think that these things once existed!

Let us measure the enormity of what Victor Hugo had dared say in 1871, just when France was reeling under the shock of a humiliating defeat at the hands of Prussia,

My revenge is my fraternity! No more frontiers! The Rhine for everyone! Let us be the same Republic, let us be the United States of Europe, let us be the continental federation, let us be European liberty, let us be universal peace! ...

What is fascinating in Jean Monnet is the intensity of a life entirely dedicated to something greater than him. Some people would describe his life as devoured by an obsession, some others would speak of a man devoted to a noble cause. But a yogi would know that it could not be better defined than as a sadhana.³⁷ True, Monnet only discovered the underlying unity of his action at the end of his life, but while he was engaged in "many" different

actions, be it in Washington, London, Paris or Luxembourg, he worked on himself in order to become a better instrument, more transparent, more efficient, more receptive. The most striking example of his self-imposed discipline was the way he used his daily walks across the countryside. Monnet always managed to live outside the city limits and used to begin his day with a long and solitary walk. He explained,

I am alone and I let my ideas place themselves at their own level. I don't decide myself to reflect on a specific topic, it comes to me naturally because of the continuity of my preoccupations. But at the end of my promenade, the conclusion comes by itself, I don't force it.
This helps me because I find that, at least in my case, conclusions should not be influenced by any personal interest or by any personal point of view. I find that the thoughts develop better when they are not influenced by any other consideration except the need to solve the problem in which my mind is engaged.³⁸

His inner concentration was not limited to the moments when he walked. Monnet constantly examined himself and tried to get rid of the weaknesses which were an obstacle to his work. He reflected on his own nature, and tried to use this knowledge of himself in order to choose the most efficient action, the one which was the most suited to the type of instrument he was. Monnet talks to himself in his personal diary, reflecting on his nature:

Algeria, July 1943  You have a great capacity for negotiations — you have a natural ability for finding your way in the maze of fluid negotiations. This ability is so natural to you that sometimes you abandon the overall view and the objective with which you started and

you allow yourself to exercise this natural ability. This is where your weakness lies. You have to use this natural ability and your faculty of persuasion for reaching the objective that you fixed in the beginning.  Your real strength is the objective, disinterested, complete view you take of a problem, and the solution that you propose for it. This is your true contribution. It is in this domain that you are superior. But this implies a preparatory work — concentration and, at the end, a conclusion — and for this to happen you must force your nature to reach a conclusion.³⁹

1946 

The moment has come when you should mobilise all your experience and concentrate for good on your objective, defining it well and excluding everything else. In order to succeed in this, you should remember that your nature can only function in an atmosphere of harmony. Remember also what the father Garrett Me Enerney said : "I let God work my mind". It means that you should let it be free — in a state of constant receptivity. No complexes, no secret thoughts. In the truth, always. ...

1948

Aims

1) Put your body and your mind in a state of harmony. Release all your natural vitality. Obtain the maximum from yourself.

Remarkably, this effort was also directed at small movements in his inner being — that which people less conscious than Monnet would call unimportant details. Here is an example also

taken from his personal notebooks,

      Alpe d'Huez, Isere, 1946 (after a trek in the mountain) Notice what happened yesterday during the walk. At a certain point I lost courage and without the guide I would have turned back. The cause was purely physical, some tiredness. After eating a little bit of sugar and resting a while, what had seemed to me impossible appeared normal and easy. This is exactly what happens in my work sometimes — apprehension of a meeting, fear to speak in public, etc.⁴⁰  

And in 1953,

My life starts only now.⁴¹ Everything up till today  has been trials only, attempts, education.  I now know when I make mistakes, and when my  temperament leads me to repeat the same mistakes, while  before I used to look at these same acts as if  they were triumphs. Now, you should know when you commit  mistakes; moreover you must correct these mistakes. All can be corrected through a certain  regularity in the discipline.⁴²

     Amazing young man, whose life "starts" at the age of 65! Indeed many people have, remarked that Monnet has been at his most active and most efficient during the period of the Action Committte for the United States of Europe (between 1955 and 1974).

    A friend of Jean Monnet, Henri Rieben, has rightly remarked that one cannot read Jean Monnet's Memoirs or even certain books recounting his life without being seized by a deep emotion.

Why is that? Rieben suggests that this is due to the fact that his voice speaks of the future and not only of the past. Indeed, with Monnet we are at the threshold of a new era in history —, an era pregnant with huge possibilities, and it is that future, unknown yet alive, that vibrates throughout the pages of Monnet's life and makes our heart beat faster as if we were children silently setting out to explore the alleys of a new domain.

As for Monnet himself, one cannot but be overwhelmed by the ardent sincerity of somebody whose entire life, entire energy and all faculties were concentrated on one aim, which was to transform the life of men. There is a fire of tapasya⁴³ that burns throughout Monnet's life, an honesty, an intensity, in front of which ordinary questions of success and failure, right and wrong, optimism or pessimism lose their meaning. Some people wondered about his spirituality. Others called him an agnostic. Words are not important. He burnt with the desire to transform life into what he saw it would have to be. His life has not been in  vain. 

The Kon-Tiki