On Education - Articles - Religious Education

Although Siegel has made an exceptional contribution to the discussion on the multi-culturalism and rationality, his conclusion is rendered somewhat less interesting since he has not included in his discussion the problem of diversity of religions. For multi-culturalism has within it powerful elements emanating from plurality of religions, each one of which presents truth claims, which cannot easily be considered to be merely cognitive entities. We need to focus on this problem in the context of intellectual criticality.

A pluralistic society needs to determine a rationally defensible attitude towards the plurality of religions that subsists within the fabric of its life and institutions. There are sharp arguments from the field of rationality against religion. The main argument is connected with the fact that all religions speak of worlds other than the physical world, even though there is no admissible proof or evidence of the existence of such worlds. It is also argued that religious experience is primarily subjective and since there is no standard of verification, it may easily be deceptive. Closely connected with these arguments is the contention that every religion has its own world view, having its own ontology and ethical doctrine, which happens to be exclusive on the grounds which cannot be defended strictly as rational. For the source of every religion is rooted in revelation or intuition, the rational credentials of which are questioned by the attitudes of critical thinking. It is also contended that religions recommend the flourishing of the attitude of faith not only as a part of the process of educational growth of the student during her pre-critical stages, but also very frequently, as an ultimate attitude in regard to religious doctrines. This seems to collide sharply with the philosophy of liberal education, which tends to insist on the flourishing of the attitudes of rationality and critical thinking as a method and aim of education and as an ultimate attitude towards life of an individual and collective existence.

It may be argued that on behalf of all those who advocate education in religion that although each religion presents a worldview, there should be no difficulty in studying that worldview as a system of philosophy along with other philosophical systems which do not claim to have their origin in religion. In reply, it has been contended that there is a fundamental difference between rationalistic worldview and religious worldview, and that the distinction lies in regard to the fact that the ultimate premises of religious world views are derived from revelation or “heavenly sent intuitions”. In support of this argument, it has been contended that revelations or intuitions cannot be shared, since they are supposed to be special gifts of the founders of religions. Again, since these revelations cannot be shared, they cannot be confirmed and their veracity cannot be verified. At a deeper level, it has been further argued that in the history of religions, there have been several revelations, and even they often collide among themselves, no way has been shown as to how this collision can be overcome.

Confronted with these arguments, it has been argued in the field of education that despite the collisions and difficulties in overcoming them, there is a good ground to make an effort to discover certain common features and common contents of truth claims or beliefs, and one could study them, and one could provide this common fund in a programme of common schooling. It has been further argued that no liberal system of education can rationally fail to provide to the students the benefits of truth claims of religions, since in any critical system of rational education, one can never ban any avenue of thought and thus prevent the exploration of any truth claim. In the train of this thought, there has been in India, for instance, the famous Report of Dr. Radhakrishnan on University Education (1949), which argued that even though religious education was constitutionally prohibited in State aided/run institutions, there should be no difficulty in providing a course at higher levels of education where students could be given the opportunity of studying major religions of the world including philosophies of these religions and all that comparative study of religions would imply. In other words, it has been suggested that education about religions cannot be objected, if religions are taught not as objects to which adherence is sought but as objects of understanding, reflection and as an instrument of tolerance and interfaith understanding.

All this, however, does not confront the central problem of the rationality of education in religion. It has been argued that although the origin of religions lies in revelations and intuitions, it is not impossible to develop rational arguments in respect of the explicit statements in which the contents of revelations are expressed. For example, the existence of God, which is a principal contention of all religions except Buddhism and Jainism, is capable of being rationally demonstrated through various arguments, such as the ontological argument, cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument and historical argument. But these arguments have been controverted, and the main difficulty lies in the fact that even if one may concede the rationality of these arguments, they do not satisfy the critical rationality which demands the proof of validity in terms of rationally justifiable evidence.

At this stage, it is necessary to consider the question as to what would constitute rationally justifiable evidence. For it may be argued that revelation or intuition itself, apart from its status as a part of scriptural texts, is a record of revelatory experiences and that revelatory experiences carry with them self-luminous and self-evidentiary value. This argument is, however, greatly weakened when it is seen that the claim of the self-evidentiary value of a revelation advocated by a given religion is questioned or contradicted by what is stated to be self-evidentiary experience advocated by rival religions. It is against this situation that the revelatory experiences advocated by rival religions stand in need to be examined by critical rationality.

All this, however, does not confront the central problem of the rationality of education in religion. It has been argued that although the origin of religions lies in revelations and intuitions, it is not impossible to develop rational arguments in respect of the explicit statements in which the contents of revelations are expressed. For example, the existence of God, which is a principal contention of all religions except Buddhism and Jainism, is capable of being rationally demonstrated through various arguments, such as the ontological argument, cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument and historical argument. But these arguments have been controverted, and the main difficulty lies in the fact that even if one may concede the rationality of these arguments, they do not satisfy the critical rationality which demands the proof of validity in terms of rationally justifiable evidence.

At this stage, it is necessary to consider the question as to what would constitute rationally justifiable evidence. For it may be argued that revelation or intuition itself, apart from its status as a part of scriptural texts, is a record of revelatory experiences and that revelatory experiences carry with them self-luminous and self-evidentiary value. This argument is, however, greatly weakened when it is seen that the claim of the self-evidentiary value of a revelation advocated by a given religion is questioned or contradicted by what is stated to be self-evidentiary experience advocated by rival religions. It is against this situation that the revelatory experiences advocated by rival religions stand in need to be examined by critical rationality.

In his book, The Spiritual Dimension, Cottingham, while discussing the problem of plurality of religions, speaks of the indifferentist approach, according to which the conflict among the truth claims of revelatory experiences need not be resolved on any rational basis, but one could choose and accept any one of the rival doctrines on the basis of a personal decision or a personal preference (Cottingham, 2005, p.154). According to this approach, all religions share a number of core ethical values, and as long as these core values are practised, it does not matter whether one belongs to Christianity or to Judaism or to Hinduism or to Buddhism. It is contended that different religious paths and doctrines may be compared to different methods of cooking dishes or to different forms of sports (ibid p. 155). It is clear that, apart from the fact that none of the religions would agree to such a description of its doctrines and value systems, it has on its own admission no justifiable rational method of dealing with the problem.

Cottingham also refer to John Hick, according to whom, the truth or reality is in itself unapproachable, since human beings are always conditioned by the cultural backgrounds in which they are born and brought up (ibid., p. 156). Hick's suggestion is basically Kantian in character. According to Kant, human beings can never experience the noumenal reality, and given the structure of the consciousness, they experience only the phenomena which are inevitably framed within the categories which are inherent in human consciousness. According to Hick, various specific forms of religious awareness are formed by the presence of the divine Reality but this presence comes to human consciousness in terms of different sets of religious concepts and structures, as also of religious meanings that operate within the different traditions of religions of the world.

It is true that there are a number of contents of spiritual revelatory or intuitive experiences which can be and are differently described in different religious traditions but the difficulty lies in the fact that the central content or Object of revelatory or intuitive experience is claimed to be seized by religions, not in the Kantian manner, but in a realistic manner, so that the core statements describing these experiences cannot be compared to differing garments resulting from differing religious traditions or differing cultural traditions. According to Buddhism, ultimate Reality is not personal at all, while according to Islam and Judaism, ultimate Reality is absolutely an unqualifiedly One and, according to Christianity, that ultimate Reality is triune.

In recognition of this situation, Cottingham considers the problem in the light of apophatic tradition, in contrast to cataphatic tradition (ibid. pp.159-161). According to this approach, the revelatory or intuitive spiritual experiences are mystic in character, and they are claimed to be indescribable or ineffable. It is argued that the ineffability of the spiritual experience prevents any philosophical argument or discussion, and therefore disputations among religious doctrines or conflicting truth claims can be dissolved by pointing out that the varying and conflicting statements of religions are only so many ways of expressing inexpressible Reality. What is important and what is common among all religions is the ineffable experience of Reality, and different formulations of that experience are of secondary importance, and conflicts among them can be dismissed by stating that all of them are imperfect, and therefore they should not be insisted upon.

In a sense, this leads us back to the solution that John Hick has proposed, since what is basically argued is that the incompatibilities of different statements simply dissolve away as the mind climbs upwards on the path of unknowing or on the path of ineffability. Against this position, it may be argued that the mystics who maintain the incomprehensibility of the Object of mystical experience do not seem to differ from sceptics or atheists, who assert that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible. Indeed, it may be answered by stating that the mystics experience the mystery of the object of mystical experience, while sceptics or atheists do not experience the mystery or do not get caught into that mystery. But even then, it may be argued that as a matter of fact mystical experiences on which different religions are based are not utterly ineffable. Cottingham, at this point of argument, admits that "even if we grant the mystics their apophatic route, there must, if theism is to retain any distinctive character whatsoever, be some road back, some way for religious faith to return from the darkness of unknowing and locate itself within the domain of a workable human language (ibid., pp. 161-162)."

Liturgy, Cottingham proposes, provides the transition from the transcendent to the human dimension. Symbolic thinking that is implied in liturgy, it is contended, is exactly what one might expect to be "the most fruitful way of approaching the deepest layers of meaning within our lives, and the most likely avenue to glimpsing the ineffable source of such meaning"(p.163). But, here again, we do not seem to come to an end of the problem. For liturgies in different religions differ, and conflicting symbolisms seem to point to conflicting objects that are not merely results of cultural diversity.

Cottingham finally argues that the problem of conflict among religions can be resolved, not by comparing and contrasting and attempting to reconcile various propositions of religious beliefs. He suggests that one should always be open to religious beliefs which are rooted in one's own culture. Since we are all culture-bound, the religion which is related to our cultural roots will appeal to us and we shall naturally adhere ourselves to it. But this should not mean that we develop dogmatism, that we should denounce others, that we should convert people of different religious beliefs to our own religious beliefs. What is important is not the propositions of our religion; we should not believe that salvation lies in carrying with us the label of the name of a religion which is rooted in our culture but in praxis of religion and practice of religion means the deepening of our inner awareness in the arrival of virtue, such as we find advocated in the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue which avoids the opposing excesses of self-aggrandisement and self-abasement, in the arrival of the golden mean, or else, in the arrival of the kind of integration advocated by psychoanalytic system of Jung. It is by integration of our own different parts of being, in our wholeness, in our integration and it is in our practice of morality, our practice of spirituality, in our perceiving oneness with all, in spite of the distances, that we find among ourselves, in spite of our maintaining those distances and differences. It is in that practice of integration, – not in insisting on distinctions and divisions of religious beliefs and practices, but in that spiritual dimension which enables us to arrive at our own integration and in looking upon others and being with others in the experience of integration that we shall find a true solution.

However, this solution does not seem to satisfy. It seems that the solution seems to avoid the complexity of the problem. Merely saying that one will be led by following the path of spiritual praxis, chosen on the basis of personal preferences or on the grounds of some common ethical value system to experience of personal integration, does not resolve the problem of conflicts in truth claims made by religions, and it does not meet the question of the rationality of the truth claims of religions. It may be added that every religion would claim to have a superior ethical system as well as superior methods of arriving at integration, and this too would lead to an unending conflict from which there seems to be no rational escape.